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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-FURTHER 
COMMENTS ON FEDERALISM-Until a decade ago, the nation's law-
yers paid little attention to the status of federal-state relations in 
the regulation of labor disputes. Today there hardly appears a 
volume of a legal journal that does not contain the product of new 
efforts to bring order out of the chaos that prevails in this area.1 
A number of writers have apparently given up the task of recon-
ciling statutory provisions with case law and case law with sound 
federal policy, and have resorted to the simpler, yet challenging, 
method of proposing amendments to existing federal statutes.2 
Worthy as these efforts may be in calling attention to the need for 
further congressional action and in suggesting possible courses for 
such action, they are of little help to unions and employers who 
are now suffering the consequences of congressional stagnation. 
New cases are appearing with what seems to be increasing fre-
quency, and recent decisions suggest the probability that a further 
increase of litigation in this area is in the offing. 
No effort will be made here to offer a complete restatement of 
the present law of federalism in labor relations. In the first place, 
there is considerable disagreement as to what that law is. In the 
second place, the legal periodicals and some of the recent decisions 
have devoted hundreds and perhaps thousands of pages to that 
task. Consequently, the aim of this comment will be only to select 
certain portions of the problem and examine those portions in the 
light of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,3 decided last March by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
I. The Areas of Jurisdictional Conflict 
At the outset, it would be well to distinguish briefly the two 
quite distinct areas of conflict between federal and state jurisdic-
tion in the labor field. First, there are those conflicts which have 
their roots in the fact that Congress has vested in the National 
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over certain disputes "affect-
ing commerce." Students of constitutional law are aware that the 
term "affecting commerce" now covers a multitude of sins-and 
1 Seven lead articles on the subject are cited in 53 MICH. L. REv. 602 at 604, n. 9 
(1955). To these may be added Roumell and Schlesinger, "The Preemption Dilemma in 
Labor Relations," 18 UNIV. DET. L.J. 17, 135 (1954-1955); Brody, "Federal Pre-emption 
Comes of Age in Labor Relations,'' 5 LAB. L.J. 743 (1954). 
2 See Roumell and Schlesinger, "The Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations," 18 
UNIV. DET. L.J. 135 (1955); Brody, "Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor Rela-
tions," 5 LAB. L.J. 743 (1954). 
a 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480 (1955). 
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sinners. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Board's power 
was soon recognized as being considerably broader in scope than 
that which available appropriations and personnel would permit 
the Board to exercise. Partly because of this and perhaps partly 
because it has been thought that matters essentially local in char-
acter should be handled by local authorities, the Board has de-
clined to take jurisdiction over certain classes of cases which fall 
within the powers granted to it by Congress.4 Here the question 
has been, who, if anyone, has jurisdiction over cases which the 
Board in its discretion has declined, or would decline, to take on 
jurisdictional grounds. The answer would be easy were it not for 
the proviso to section 10 (a) of the amended National Labor Rela-
tions Act.5 This proviso states, in substance, that the Board has 
power to cede its jurisdiction to state agencies under certain condi-
tions, one of which is that the applicable state law may not be in-
consistent with "the corresponding provision" of the Taft-Hartley 
Act. Since no state labor law is patterned exactly along the lines 
of Taft-Hartley, no state has "corresponding provisions" which 
enable its agencies to receive grants of jurisdiction from the 
Board.6 Thus, the proviso to section 10 (a) serves no purpose 
other than to offer support for the idea that a vacuum is created 
when the Board declines to take jurisdiction-a vacuum wherein 
neither federal nor state law is applicable. That such a vacuum 
does indeed exist continues to be the view of some courts7 and 
4 The most recent announcement of standards which the Board will employ in de-
ciding whether to assume jurisdiction over a given case appears in NLRB Releases R-445 
and R-449, July 1 and 15, 1954. On the scope of Board jurisdiction, see, generally, I 
CCH LAB. L. REP. ifl610 (1955). Approval of the Board's practice of limiting its own 
jurisdiction was indicated in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 
341 U.S. 675, 71 S.Ct. 943 (1951). 
5 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 146, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160. The 
post Taft-Hartley history of this section is discussed in Brody, "Federal Pre-emption Comes 
of Age in Labor Relations," 5 LAB. L.J. 743 at 764 (1954), where the author points out 
that Congress has been reluctant to amend the section even though the problems it has 
created have been recognized. 
6 To date no cession agreements have been made by the Board pursuant to the 
proviso to §10 (a). But see Satin, Inc. v. Local Union 445, !BEW, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954) 
26 CCH Lab. Cas. if68,508, for an instance in which a state court construed a Board refusal 
to assert its jurisdiction as a cession under this proviso. The soundness of such a con-
struction is, to say the least, questionable. 
7See Retail Clerks Local 1564 v. Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, (10th Cir. 1955) 225 
F. (2d) 659; Adelphia Construction Co. v. Building &: Construction Trades Council of 
Philadelphia, (Pa. Com. Pl. 1954) 27 CCH Lab. Cas. 'fi68,843; Universal Car and Service 
Co. of Grand Rapids v. 1AM, Lodge 1573, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954) 27 CCH Lab. Cas. ,I68,825; 
WERB v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 200, 267 Wis. 356, 66 N.W. (2d) 318 
(1954). But see Satin, Inc. v. Local Union 445, !BEW, (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954) 26 CCH 
Lab. Cas. 'fi68,508; Cleveland v. Local Union 655, Plumbers, (Pa. Com. Pl. 1954) 27 CCH 
Lab. Cas. 'fi68,842. Cf. NYSLRB v. Wags Transportation System, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) 26 
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writers.8 Its very absurdity, however, may well result in Supreme 
Court disregard for this strict interpretation of section 10 (a), in 
so far as Board refusals to accept jurisdiction are concerned.9 
The other area of jurisdictional conflict is broader in scope 
than the one just described; it is not occasioned by the Board's ex-
ercise of discretionary power to decline jurisdiction. Instead, it 
stems from the fact that the Board has not been given exclusive 
jurisdiction over all types of labor disputes in industries affecting 
commerce. Federal legislation has created certain rights and has 
prohibited some specified types of conduct, but some powers have, 
nevertheless, been reserved to the states. Thus, the· Board's juris-
diction is limited in subject matter to that which has been con-
ferred upon it. At the same time, in so far as Congress has not 
acted to govern completely a particular sphere of activity, some 
authority remains in state agencies. Just where that state author-
ity begins and ends, however, is more than a little in doubt. First, 
it is apparent that the exact limits of Board jurisdiction to grant 
relief have not yet been fixed. In fact, it is unlikely that they will 
· ever be fixed with precision under current statutes because of the 
broad language employed in section 7 and 8 of the amended 
CCH Lab. Cas. ,I68,754. In the Universal Car case, supra, the court concluded that to 
recognize the vacuum would be a lesser evil than the chaos that woµld result from having 
state court jurisdiction depend upon the day to day discretionary jurisdiction of the 
Board, that discretion being dependent upon budgetary conditions and the economic, 
political and social views of the Board members. Apparently the court entertains the' 
quaint notion that an absence of law is better than a changing law. 
State labor boards have also had occasion to adopt one view or the other. The 
Michigan, New York and Wisconsin boards have rejected the "no-man's land" view. See 
6 L\B. L.J. 602 (1955). 
8 E.g.: Hays, "Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States," 102 UNIV. PA. 
L .. REv. 959 at 976 (1954); Brody, "Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor Relations,'' 
5 LAB. L.J. 743 at 763 (1954). Both authors, however, deplore the result. 
9 See Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933, 74 S.Ct. 373 
(1954), where the Supreme Court declined to pass on the question of state court juris-
diction because the Board had not yet refused to entertain the case and there had been 
no showing that it would have been futile to apply to the Board for relief. 
In the course of announcing a rather novel "solution" to the vacuum dilemma in two 
recent cases, the California Supreme Court neatly sidestepped the language of §IO (a). _In 
Benton, Inc. v. Painters Local 333, (Calif. 1955) 37 L.R.R.M. 2251, it was held that where 
an employer's business affects interstate commerce but does not meet the Board's mini-
mum jurisdictional standards, a state court is without jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful 
organizational picketing in the absence of an express refusal by the Board to take juris-
diction. On the other hand, in Garmon v. Building Trades Council, (Calif. 1955) 37 
L.R.R.M. 2233, it was held that where the Regional Director has affirmatively refused to 
take jurisdiction on behalf of the Board, a state court has jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful 
organizational picketing, even if the employer's business affects interstate commerce. The 
most remarkable feature of the latter decision was the court's conclusion that in such cir-
cumstances the state court will apply federal law rather than state law. At least one feature 
of the case is not remarkable: three judges dissented. 
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NLRA and because of the changing interpretations of that lan-
guage by the Board itself. Second, there appears to be some basis 
for concluding that, as to very limited areas at least, both the 
Board and a state agency may, on different grounds, exercise juris-
diction over the same conduct. 
At the very least, a birdseye view of decisional law leading up 
to Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. is necessary to a proper appre-
ciation of the contribution made by that case. Weber, however, 
involved only the second of the two classes of jurisdictional prob-
lems described above, i.e., those cases in which the Board has not 
declined to entertain the matter on jurisdictional grounds. The 
remainder of this comment, therefore, will be devoted principally 
to an examination of problems in that class of cases. 
A. Prohibited Areas of State Action. The states are pre-
cluded from interfering with or restraining the free exercise of 
rights granted by federal labor legislation. This principle itself is 
a rather simple outgrowth of the supremacy clause of the Con-
stitution, but the labor cases in which the Supreme Court has 
found occasion to invoke it have involved subtle questions of 
whether the particular state regulations actually constituted in-
fringements upon federally granted rights.10 State agencies and 
courts are also precluded from entertaining questions involving 
certification of appropriate bargaining units and representatives 
in industries affecting commerce.11 Finally, the states may not 
enjoin under their own labor legislation conduct which is for-
bidden by federal labor law.12 
B. Permissible Areas of State Action. Injunctions and other 
remedies under state law are available where violence occurs or is 
threatened or where mass picketing takes place.13 The same is 
true where a union engages in recurrent and unannounced work 
stoppages,14 and where other matters are involved which are 
neither regulated nor consciously left unregulated by Congress.15 
Finally, the state court damage remedy is sometimes available since 
10 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945); Amalgamated Street Ry. Employ-
ees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951); International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 
454, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950). 
11 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYSLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947); La Crosse 
Telephone Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379 (1949). 
12 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). 
13 Allen-Bradley Local No. llll v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942). 
14International Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949), the 
so-called Briggs-Stratton case. 
15Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584 (1949). 
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the federal law does not provide for compensatory relief in all 
cases and thus there is no conflict between state and federal 
remedies.16 This is the case at least where the conduct complained 
of is_ not protected under Taft-Hartley. 
II. The Contribution of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 
Two unions in the St. Louis area, the International Association 
of Machinists and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners (hereinafter referred to as the IAM and the Carpenters), 
each claimed the same type of work for their respective members. 
Each union represented a portion of the employees of the Anheu-
ser-Busch company. From 1948 to 1952, with the exception of 
one year, there appeared in the contract between the IAM and 
the company a provision to the effect that when the repair or re-
placement of machinery was necessary, this work would be given 
only to those contractors who had collective agreements with IAM. 
Prior to negotiations on the 1952 contract between IAM and the 
company, the Carpenters threatened to make no new contract with 
the company unless this provision was deleted from the IAM con-
tract. The company therefore refused to agree to a renewal of 
that provision in the 1952 IAM contract, whereupon the IAM 
went on strike. The company immediately filed charges against 
the IAM with the NLRB, alleging that the union was engaging in 
an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the 
amended NLRA. Eleven days later the company filed charges 
against the IAM in a state court, alleging that the strike constituted 
not only a secondary boycott under Missouri law, but also a viola-
tion of subsection (A), (B) and (D) of section 8 (b) (4) of the 
amended NLRA and section 303 (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act. After obtaining a temporary injunc-
tion in the state court, the c~mpany amended its complaint to in-
clude a charge that the conduct of the IAM constituted an illegal 
conspiracy in restraint of trade under Missouri common .law and 
conspiracy statutes. The state court injunction was made perma-
nent on September 30, 1952, some seven weeks before the Board 
quashed the notice of a hearing on the alleged violation of section 
8 (b) (4) (D). When the Board finally acted on November 18, 
1952, it held that there was no unfair labor practice under section 
8 (b) (4) (D) in the conduct of the IAM strike.17 On February 8, 
16 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Co., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 
m~~ . 
17 District No. 9, 1AM, IOI N.L.R.B. 346 (1952). 
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1954, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the 1AM strike was 
enjoinable under the state's restraint of trade statute. The state 
supreme court treated the Board's action as a determination that 
no unfair labor practice was involved.18 On certiorari, this deci-
sion was unanimously reversed by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
The Court first rejected the state court's conclusion that the 
Board's action amounted to a finding that no unfair labor practice 
was involved. A determination that there was no violation of 
section 8 (b) (4) (D), said the Court, does not necessarily mean that 
there was no violation of other provisions of the federal law.19 
Moreover, such a determination does not settle the question of 
whether the conduct involved was protected under section 7 of the 
amended NLRA. In each case, said the Court, it is for the Board 
to determine whether the conduct complained of may be violative 
of other provisions of the federal law or may be a protected activity 
under section 7. Having found that there was some reasonable 
possibility that the IAM strike was either an unfair labor practice 
or a protected activity, the Court concluded that the state court 
had no jurisdiction in the matter because the Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction to enjoin conduct which has been regulated by the 
federal government. 
It was urged before the Court that this case was distinguishable 
from Garner v. Teamsters Union20 on the ground that here the 
union activity was enjoined under a "general" statute having no 
particular relevance to labor relations, whereas in the Garner case 
the state was attempting to regulate, in a labor statute, the same 
conduct that was covered by the federal act. The Court's answer 
to this contention is both interesting and mildly surprising. 
"We do not think this distinction is decisive. In Garner 
the emphasis was not on two conflicting labor statutes but 
rather on two similar remedies, one state and one federal, 
brought to bear on precisely the same conduct. And in Capital 
18 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber, 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W. (2d) 325 (1954). 
19 The limitations imposed upon Board jurisdiction by the Taft-Hartley Act dictate 
this conclusion. The Board is empowered to issue unfair labor practice complaints, con-
duct hearings and render decisions only when charges have been filed by a party inter-
ested in the dispute. This being the case, a party could circumvent the pre-emption 
doctrine simply by filing an unfair labor practice charge on the weakest possible ground 
and getting an adverse determination from the Board. This evasive tactic is foreclosed 
by the holding in the Weber case. 
20 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). 
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Service, Inc. v. Labor Board . . .. we did not stop to inquire 
just what category of 'public policy' the union's conduct al-
legedly violated."21 
Whether the Court intended this language to mean that a state's 
interest in the matter is entirely immaterial when an unfair labor 
practice is involved is not quite clear. If such was the meaning of 
the italicized passage above, the result would be that even violent 
conduct, such as was involved in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. 
W ERB, 22 and unannounced work stoppages, such as were involved 
in International Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB,23 would not be sub-
ject to a state injunction if an unfair labor practice coincidentally 
accompanied the violence or the work stoppages.24 (It will be re-
called that in neither of these cases was there any serious suggestion 
that the enjoined activity constituted an unfair labor practice, and 
in each case it was determined by the Court that the activity was 
not protected under federal law. In fact, there was no such thing 
as an unfair labor practice by a union at the time of the Allen-
Bradley case.) If, on the other hand, the Court merely intended 
to exclude as a basis for the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction 
those state policies which are shields for the regulation of labor 
relations or which threaten to impede substantially the orderly 
regulation of matters within Board jurisdiction, then the Allen-
Bradley and Briggs-Stratton cases still authorize effective state 
restraints on labor activities. This would seem to be the better 
interpretation of the Court's language. The opinion in the Weber 
case contains several approving references to Allen-Bradley, and 
nowhere else in the opinion is it suggested that the doctrine of that 
case was being impaired. 
21 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 at 479-480, 75 S.Ct. 480 (1955). Em-
phasis added. 
22 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942). 
23 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949), the so-called Briggs-Stratton case. 
24 Following the Garner case, it was thought in some circles that the states were 
precluded from entertaining jurisdiction to restrain violence growing out of labor dis-
putes in industries affecting commerce. State courts have uniforII!-lY held, however, that 
the power of the states in this regard was unimpaired by the Garner case. Perez v. 
Trifiletti, (Fla. 1954) 74 S. (2d) 100; WERB v. United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Imple-
ment Workers, (Wis. 1955) 70 N.W. (2d) 191. In McQuay, Inc. v. International Union, 
UAW-CIO, (Minn. 1955) 72 N.W. (2d) 81, a case in which the Weber case was cited, it 
was expressly held that a state court may enjoin violent conduct even when that conduct 
also constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act. No case has been 
found in which a contrary result was reached, and it seems safe to say that there will be 
none under current legislation. If violence falls within state jurisdiction even when 
accompanying an otherwise protected activity, it is difficult to see why an accompanying 
unfair labor practice should deprive _the state of jurisdiction. In either event the rela-
tionship of the state agency to the NLRB is the same. 
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Regardless of which of the above two interpretations is the 
correct one, it is nevertheless true that several other Supreme 
Court decisions have diminished considerably in significance with 
the announcement of the Weber decision. In Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co.,25 the Supreme Court sustained the constitu-
tionality of a state injunction against picketing which sought to 
compel the violation of a state restraint of trade statute. The only 
constitutional issue praised or considered was the validity of the 
decree under the Fourteenth Amendment.26 And in Building 
Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam,21 the Court 
upheld an injunction which restrained picketing designed to com-
pel a hotel operator to employ union workers. Again the atten-
tion of the Court was directed to the Fourteenth Amendment 
rather than to the developing concept of federal pre-emption. 
The significance of these cases must now be confined to the actual 
basis upon which they were decided, i.e., that the states may im-
pose reasonable restraints upon peaceful picketing without violat-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment.28 No longer can it be said that 
such restraints upon picketing or other concerted activities are 
valid exercises of state police powers where there is some reason-
able possibility that the activity is prohibited or protected by Taft-
Hartley. The Court leaves no doubt on this point. 
" ... where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor prac-
tices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within 
the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the con-
duct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably 
deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, 
the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the 
tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such 
issues in the first instance. "29 
25 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949). 
26 The opinion in the Giboney case gives not the slightest hint of whether the employ-
er's operations "affected interstate commerce" so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction 
of the NLRB. ' 
27 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950). 
28 Two other cases often cited together with the Giboney and Gazzam cases as up-
holding state powers in the realm of labor relations are International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950), and Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 
U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950). Actually, however, these cases, like Giboney and GazzaJD, 
provide no authority for state court jurisdiction over matters regulated by federal labor 
law. 
29 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 478 at 481, 75 S.Ct. 480 (1955). In Local 
No. 25, IBT v. N.Y., N.H., 8: H.R. Co., 350 U.S. 155, 76 S.Ct. 227 (1956), the Court in-
voked the quoted language in holding that a state court was without jurisdiction because 
the plaintiff below had alleged an unfair labor practice in its amended complaint and 
the Board had not declined to take jurisdiction. The opinion of the Court contains no 
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Of added significance in this context is the Court's repetition of 
language in the Garner case to the effect that peaceful picketing in 
industries affecting commerce may not be restrained by the states 
because Congress prescribed a detailed procedure for the restraint 
of specified types of picketing and apparently intended that other 
types would be free from further restraint.30 
III. Some Practical Effects of the Weber Decision 
There will doubtless be circumstances in which a state court 
will feel free to exercise its injunctive powers even though labor 
relations in industries affecting interstate commerce are involved. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court apparently expects the state courts and 
boards to do so where the facts of a particular case do not appear 
to fall within the test formulated in the Weber case. Realizing 
that the boundaries of the area pre-empted by the Taft-Hartley 
Act are by no means precise, the Court has determined to fix those 
boundaries through an arduous case-by-case method.31 Only 
prompt action by Congress can save the Court and the parties from 
this expensive and troublesome procedure for fixing the law of the 
land. , 
There will, however, be many circumstances in which the state 
court will want to be satisfied that the dispute involves neither a 
protected nor a prohibited activity under Taft-Hartley before it 
will assume jurisdiction. In such a case, the party considering 
himself to be aggrieved and entitled to injunctive relief has no 
alternative but to file a charge with the Board.32 In so doing, it 
reference to the employer's argument that the evidence failed to show the occurrence of 
an unfair labor practice. See 24 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3134 (1955). 
30 Indicative of the fact that all state courts are not prepared to accept the Garner 
language concerning picketing as being sound law is the decision of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Milwaukee Boston Store Co. v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 
(Wis. 1955) 6~ N.W. (2d) 762. Even Justice Frankfurter's repetition of that language in 
the Weber case failed to impress the Wisconsin court. See also the California cases referred 
to in note 9 supra. 
31 It is interesting to note that the Court, with Justice Frankfurter leading the way, 
has departed from its former policy of fixing arbitrary limits to state jurisdiction in this 
field. Compare the opinion of the Court, and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, 
in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYSLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 {1947). See also Cox, 
"Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations," 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954), where the 
author argues thaf arbitrary boundaries of state jurisdiction are preferable to the flexible 
and uncertain standards now employed _by the Court. Professor Cox points out that the 
policy now in effect is excessively burdensome and expensive to litigants, and that the 
occasional hardships which would attend the fixing of more certain standards do not 
warrant this burden and expense. 
. 32 Of course, if a damage action is available to him, he may avail himself of the rule 
of United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833 (1954). 
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will behoove him to allege every conceivable violation of the fed-
eral act, for if he fails to allege some possible ground for obtaining 
relief from the Board, his access to the state court or board will 
remain closed. At this point, he is at the mercy of the regional 
director or the general counsel of the Board. These officials may 
in an appropriate case refuse to issue a complaint on jurisdictional 
grounds, thus raising the first class of federalism problems dis-
cussed above. Secondly, they may refuse to issue a complaint on 
the ground that no unfair labor practice has been committed by 
the party against whom the charge is brought.33 In this event, it 
may at first appear that the way is clear for the complainant to 
bring his action before a state court or board. But the situation 
is not this simple. The activity complained of may be either pro-
tected or prohibited under federal law, but it is not the function 
of the regional director or general counsel to determine whether 
a given activity is protected or prohibited. Their function in the 
realm of unfair labor practices is limited to the issuance of com-
plaints and the prosecution of those complaints before the Board 
or its hearing officers. Thus, it is by no means clear that a refusal 
on the part of these officials to issue a complaint will satisfy a 
state court that it is entitled to entertain the cause.34 
Supposing, however, that a complaint is issued on each charge 
alleged by the moving party (an unlikely event since that party 
will have alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act on every con-
ceivable ground, some of which are likely to be tenuous), the case 
will then be carried to the Board. If the requested relief is granted, 
the complainant will probably be satisfied despite the usual delay 
in processing such complaints. If he is denied relief, the scope 
of the Board's determination will become important. If the Board 
determines only that no unfair labor practice was committed, it 
is conceivable that the state court would still decline to assume 
jurisdiction because the conduct "may be reasonably deemed" to 
come within the protection afforded by the Taft-Hartley Act. If, 
on the other hand, the Board decides that the conduct complained 
of was not only not an unfair labor practice, but was also a protected 
activity, then the charging party is definitely foreclosed from any 
33 The determination of the general counsel is conclusive in this respect. 
34 The general counsel's refusal to issue a complaint may result from the fact that 
his investigation discloses no activity which, in his estimation, constitutes an unfair labor 
practice. The question left open by such a refusal is whether Congress has either pro• 
tected the activity or determined that it shall be left unregulated. In either event the state 
court or board is seemingly precluded from exercising jurisdiction. See Gulf Shipside 
Storage Corp. v. Moore, (La. 1955) 23 U.S. LAW WEEK 2494 (1955). See also note 36 infra. 
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state m1unctive remedy.35 Only if the Board decides that the 
activity in issue is neither protected nor prohibited is the way 
open for the assumption of state jurisdiction to issue injunctions.36 
I.t follows from what has been said that the Weber case imposes 
upon the Board a moral obligation to state with clarity and com-
pleteness its basis for denying relief in an unfair labor practice 
case. Failing such clarity and completeness, a party may be denied 
a remedy from a state court or board although he is entitled to it. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Weber case has not fixed with precision the line of demar-
cation between exclusive federal jurisdiction and state jurisdic-
tion. It has, however, cleared away at least one barrier to clear 
thinking in confining the Giboney and Gazzam cases to the limited 
issues they involved. 
Together with this clarification, the Court has highlighted 
what promises to be a new classification of state police powers. A 
subtle contrast has been made between the states' "historic powers 
over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order"37 
and their powers to regulate labor matters through the medium of 
laws designed primarily for controlling harmful business and trade 
practices. As stated above, the states are apparently still free to 
restrain violence and other breaches of the peace irrespective of 
accompanying unfair labor practices or the exercise of otherwise 
protected activities. In this respect, the states exercise powers 
over "local matters." On the other hand, the control of trade 
restraints and monopolies and· the imposition of obligations upon 
common carriers are apparently deemed to be something other 
than "local matters" since a state may not now exercise these 
powers when the conduct sought to be controlled is also governed 
by federal labor law.38 
What basis the Court finds for such a classification is not made 
clear by the opinion in the Weber case. While the Court invokes 
the "conflict of remedies" reasoning of the Garner case, it is sub-
mitted that this reasoning is not an adequate justification for the 
35 Appeal may be taken to the appropriate circuit court of appeals. 
36 The state agency must still contend, however, with the theory suggested in Garner 
and repeated in Weber that when Congress has regulated certain types of conduct in 
considerable detail, it· has impliedly decreed that other related conduct shall remain 
unregulated by state law. 
37 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 at 749, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942). 
38 In addition to the Weber case, see General Drivers, Warehousemen, 8: Helpers, 
Local Union No. 89 v. American Tobacco Co., 348 U.S. 978, 75 S.Ct. 569 (1955). 
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nullification of state business regulations merely because an unfair 
labor practice may be involved. It is at least arguable that the 
problem of regulating business activity is as much a matter of 
"local concern" as is the problem of restraining violent conduct 
occurring in the context of labor disputes. And if the concept of 
"conflict" may be interpreted to include, in part, an equivalence 
in the activities the two regulatory systems are designed to govern, 
there is, to this degree, no conflict between state restraints on un-
lawful business and trade practices and federal restraints on un-
fair labor practices. There is, it is submitted, much to be said 
for approaching the problem as one of characterizing the vantage 
point underlying the attempted state regulation. 
It may be that the Court has extended the scope of pre-emption 
announced in Garner because of a fear or suspicion that state 
business regulations were being used to circumvent federal 
authority over labor matters. There are indications that such a 
trend has been gaining momentum. Nevertheless, if this is the 
rationale of the Court, one may question with reason the breadth 
of the new pre-emption doctrine. Surely the task of distinguishing 
between legitimate state business laws and those that are merely 
colorable devices for regulating labor matters is not insurmount-
able. 
Robert B. Olsen, S.Ed. 
